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The creative aspect of language use provides a set of phenomena that a 
science of language must explain. It is the “central fact to which any signi-
ficant linguistic theory must address itself” and thus “a theory of language 
that neglects this ‘creative’ aspect is of only marginal interest” (Chomsky 
1964: 7–8). Therefore, the form and explanatory depth of linguistic science is 
restricted in accordance with this aspect of language. In this paper, the 
implications of the creative aspect of language use for a scientific theory of 
language will be discussed, noting the possible further implications for a 
science of the mind. It will be argued that a corollary of the creative aspect of 
language use is that a science of language can study the mechanisms that 
make language use possible, but that such a science cannot explain how 
these mechanisms enter into human action in the form of language use. 
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1. The Creative Aspect of Language Use 
 
The creative aspect of language use provides a set of phenomena that a science of 
language must explain. It is indeed the “central fact to which any significant 
linguistic theory must address itself” and thus “a theory of language that neglects 
this ‘creative’ aspect is of only marginal interest” (Chomsky 1964: 7–8). As a 
result, the form and explanatory depth of a science of language will be restricted 
in accordance with this aspect of language. I will discuss the implications of the 
creative aspect of language use for a scientific theory of language, noting along 
the way the possible further implications for a science of the mind. I will argue 
that a corollary of the creative aspect of language use is that a science of language 
can study the mechanisms that make language use possible, but for reasons to be 
explored such a science may be unable to shed light on how these mechanisms 
enter into free human action in the form of language use. 
 The creative aspect of language use refers to the kind of linguistic creativity 
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that is displayed in ordinary human linguistic production and comprehension. 
All humans have the ability to produce and understand an infinite number of 
novel sentences — sentences that are new in the linguistic experience of the 
speaker/hearer and perhaps also new in the history of their language. Descartes 
saw an essential difference between humans and other animals that was most 
clearly exhibited by our linguistic ability to form new statements, which express 
new thoughts and are appropriate to but not directly caused by their contexts. 
Chomsky (2002 [1966]: 53) summarises Descartes’s views as follows:1  
 
[…] it is the diversity of human behavior, its appropriateness to new situ-
ations, and man’s capacity to innovate — the creative aspect of language use 
providing the principal indication of this — that leads Descartes to attribute 
possession of mind to other humans, since he regards this capacity as 
beyond the limitations of any imaginable mechanism. Thus [according to 
Descartes] a fully adequate psychology requires the postulation of a ‘creat-
ive principle’ alongside of the ‘mechanical principle’ that suffices to account 
for all other aspects of the inanimate and animate world and for a sig-
nificant range of human actions and ‘passions’ as well. 
 
 The creative aspect of language use thus poses a problem for a science of 
language because human language, “being free from control by identifiable 
external stimuli or internal physiological states, can serve as a general instrument 
of thought and self-expression rather than merely as a communicative device of 
report, request, or command [as animal communication systems appear to be]” 
(ibid., 57). In other words, the problem is how to account for the creative aspect 
of language use in a scientific context when it appears to be a form of free human 
action. The solution to this problem involves accepting that the mechanisms 
underlying the creative aspect of language use can be a fruitful subject matter for 
a science of language, but that language use itself may not be.  
 The main issues that Descartes raised in regard to human language use are 
that (1) it allows for an unbounded expression of thought and (2) it is 
independent of direct stimulus control yet at the same time (3) it is appropriate to 
new situations and coherent in new contexts. 
 
1.1. Unboundedness 
 
Linguistic productivity is the ability to produce and understand an unlimited 
number of sentences that one has not previously encountered. Descartes viewed 
productivity in all domains — language, mathematics, vision, etc. — as deriving 
from a single source. Modern cognitive science has taken a modular approach, 
insisting that each domain has its own productivity engine (cf. Brattico & 
Liikkanen, 2009). In order for a grammar to be able to produce from the set of 
finite primitive elements an infinite set of expressions it must be recursive. The 
details of the notion of recursion need not concern us here, suffice it to say that it 
involves embedding a structural object within another instance of itself — as 
when a noun phrase is embedded within another noun phrase (for more on re-
cursion, see Parker 2006, Tomalin 2007, and Zwart 2011). Non-linguistic examples 
                                                 
    1 Cf. den Ouden (1975), Bracken (1983), and D’Agostino (1984); see also Schouls (2000) for 
detailed discussion of Descartes’ views on the nature and possibility of science. 
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include the way in which the set of natural numbers is defined recursively, 
recursion in music (e.g., Jackendoff & Lerdahl 2006), or the recursion that is 
displayed in spatial reasoning and navigation. Fitch et al. (2005, p. 186) illustrate 
recursion by asking the reader to consider “such concepts as ((((the hole) in the 
tree) in the glade) by the stream) and ask whether there is an obvious limit to 
such embedding of place concepts within place concepts (… in the forest by the 
plain between the mountains in the north of the island…)”. 
 
1.2. Stimulus Freedom 
 
The second issue Descartes raised in regard to the creative aspect of language use 
relates to the fact that a person’s use of language is stimulus-free in the sense that 
verbal behaviour is “free of identifiable external stimuli or internal physiological 
states” (Chomsky 2002 [1966]: 110, fn. 11). That is: 
 
Though our language use is appropriate to situations, it is not controlled by 
stimulus conditions. Language serves as an instrument for free expression of 
thought, unbounded in scope, uncontrolled by stimulus conditions though 
appropriate to situations, available for use in whatever contingencies our 
thought processes can comprehend.       (Chomsky 1980: 222) 
 
 One can easily think of examples that show this sort of stimulus freedom. 
One can speak of elephants when there is nothing in the speaker’s environment 
that could conceivably be called a stimulus that caused the utterances. Or one 
could speak of Federico Lorca’s Poet In New York when the only conceivable 
stimulus in the speaker’s environment is elephants and the African landscape. 
Under no notion of causality can such utterances be said to have been caused by 
anything in the speaker’s environment. If one does attempt to offer a casual 
explanation it will not be causality as scientifically construed, but rather the 
interpretation of a speech event as part of a pattern that can only be identified a 
posteriori (cf. McGilvray 2001).  
 Stimulus-freedom implies not only that language use has no direct causal 
relation with the environment of the speaker/hearer; Chomsky also argues that 
there is a sense in which language use has no strict causal relation with internal 
states either. Thus, he remarks that “Descartes and his followers observed that 
the normal use of language is constantly innovative, unbounded, apparently free 
from control by external stimuli or internal states, coherent and appropriate to 
situations” (Chomsky 1988: 5, my emphasis). Elsewhere, Chomsky refers to a 
normal feature of everyday usage of language: “the fact that it is typically 
innovative, guided but not determined by internal state and external conditions, 
appropriate to circumstances but uncaused, eliciting thoughts that the hearer 
might have expressed the same way” (Chomsky 1996: 17, my emphasis).  
 The issue at hand, however, is not the existence of internal or external 
causes, but rather the viability of including environmental causes or specific 
internal causes of language use within a scientific theory of language. A scientific 
theory of language cannot be a fruitful and deeply explanatory one if it insists on 
including such purported causes or correlations with the environment — or, 
given the proper qualifications, with internal states. 
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1.3. Coherence and Appropriateness to Circumstance 
 
“The normal use of language”, writes Chomsky, “is thus free and undetermined 
but yet appropriate to situations; and it is recognised as appropriate by other 
participants in the discourse situations who might have reacted in similar ways 
and whose thoughts, evoked by this discourse, correspond to those of the 
speaker” (Chomsky 1988: 5). In other words, linguistic “discourse is not a series 
of random utterances but fits the situation that evokes it but does not cause it” 
(ibid.). People assume that the utterances of their interlocutors are relevant, 
coherent, and appropriate to the circumstance at hand. And even when an 
utterance fails to do so, we impose an interpretation on it in which it is assumed 
to be relevant, coherent, and appropriate. 
 A science of language has to deal with the fact that novel sentences are 
appropriate to though not determined solely by the circumstances of their use. If 
in addition to the mechanisms that make language use possible, a theory insists 
on including within its scope aspects of language use then it must contend with 
the fact that it is unclear what counts as a relevant or appropriate circumstance 
(e.g., Giora 1997). Claiming that a circumstance is that which is judged to be 
coherent by a speaker/hearer only poses the question to be answered and does 
not provide any insight. Wilson & Sperber (2004: 611), for example, believe that: 
 
The fact that ostensive stimuli create expectations of relevance follows from 
the definition of an ostensive stimulus and the Cognitive Principle of 
Relevance. An ostensive stimulus is designed to attract the audience’s 
attention. Given the universal tendency to maximise relevance, an audience 
will only pay attention to a stimulus that seems relevant enough. By 
producing an ostensive stimulus, the communicator therefore encourages 
her audience to presume that it is relevant enough to be worth processing. 
 
However, everyday language use is replete with ambiguities, allusions, meta-
phors, and many other similar phenomena, and contexts of speech are enormous-
ly varied and only tenuously related to particular utterances. It is thus unlikely 
that one can construct a theory that, say, systematically lists the circumstances to 
which a particular utterance is supposed to be appropriate. The reason is that, as 
Descartes noticed, although expressions are appropriate to circumstances, they 
are stimulus free and causally unrelated to the speaker’s environment. A fortiori, 
being appropriate cannot be equated with being caused by environmental conditions, 
for the purported correlation between language and the world is suspect (cf. 
McGilvray 2001). This is the externalist conception of semantics criticised below. 
 It is important to stress that the claim is not that correlations do not exist. 
Rather, the claim is that even though correlations may exist in some form, they 
are not a fecund subject matter for a serious science of language. One may object 
that, say, relevance theory in pragmatics or formal semantics do not aim at the 
rigour, formal structures, or explanatory methods or models of science per se. 
However, there are plenty of theorists who explicitly claim that their theory of 
language is scientific in the sense that it can posit lawful correlations between 
linguistic behaviour and aspects of the environment and the contexts in which 
utterances are produced. Paul Horwich (1998, 2005) is a case in point — he claims 
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that his use-based theory of semantics is compatible with a linguistics construed 
as an empirical science. 
 To recap, then, the main issues that Descartes raised in regard to the 
creative aspect of language use are: that language use allows for an unbounded 
expression of thought and is independent of direct stimulus control, yet at the 
same time it is appropriate to new situations and coherent in new contexts. 
Before detailing the implications that such observations have in regard to a 
science of language, what follows are some remarks about linguistics and science. 
 
 
2. Linguistics and Science 
 
For the purposes of this article one can make a distinction between two methods 
of constructing a scientific theory of language: an externalist approach and an 
internalist approach. The classic arguments for externalism are found in Putnam 
(1975), Burge (1979), and Kripke (1980).2 The main externalist claim is that mental 
states are individuated by reference to environmental features or social contexts, 
and therefore in order for a person to have intentional mental states they must be 
related to the environment in the right way. Externalism entails that if two 
individuals are physically identical their respective utterances of, say, water, can 
still have different meanings if the relevant features of their environment are 
different. 
 Externalism has become a widely held position that is especially popular 
within the philosophies of mind and language. Indeed, some feel that “external-
ism has been so successful that the primary focus of today’s debate is not so 
much on whether externalism is right or wrong, but rather on what its impli-
cations are” (Wikforss 2008: 158), and that “Over the past 30 years much of the 
philosophical community has become persuaded of the truth of content extern-
alism“ (Majors & Sawyer 2005: 257). Externalism has thus become “almost an 
orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind” (Farkas 2003: 187).  
 Internalism, on the other hand, holds that, for the purposes of scientific inquiry 
into language, the internal properties of the human mind are the relevant and 
fruitful subject matter of scientific research. Internalism (more specifically, 
Chomskyan internalism) has thus recast the notion of language qua social 
phenomenon or abstract object into a form that is susceptible to empirical 
scientific inquiry. Hinzen provides the following succinct definition of 
Chomskyan internalism:  
 
Internalism is an explanatory strategy that makes the internal structure and 
constitution of the organism a basis for the investigation of its external 
function and the ways in which it is embedded in an environment. 
(Hinzen 2006: 139)  
 
                                                 
    2 Cf. also Burge (1986), Davidson (1987), and McGinn (1989). Wikforss (2008) is an excellent 
overview and discussion of externalism. It should be noted, however, that even though the 
umbrella term externalism applies to them all, these citations of externalists should not be 
taken to imply that they all necessarily have similar arguments or that they are in agreement 
with one another. 
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Internalism thus studies the internal structure and mechanisms of an organism; 
the external environment comes into the picture when the internal processes are 
ascribed content by the theorist, thus explaining how the internal mechanisms 
constitute a cognitive process in a particular environment. Such content 
ascriptions vary with the theorist’s interests and aims, but the (ascription of) 
content is not an essential part of the internalist theory itself (cf. Egan 1995). 
 I argue that whatever merits externalism may possess and despite its 
popularity, it is unable to provide a fruitful framework for a scientific theory of 
language. One might object, however, that externalists do not see their enterprise 
as scientific and thus it is a moot point to compare it to other scientific pursuits. 
But there are externalists (Putnam, Davidson, Horwich, Fodor, Burge, and others) 
who explicitly state that their theory is a scientific one. Thus, since both 
externalists and Chomskyan internalists claim their theories to be scientific, it is 
possible and illuminating to compare the two from the perspective of scientific 
explanatory strategies and to ask which of the two is the most promising avenue 
in regard to constructing an explanatory scientific theory of language. 
 In other words, while it is true that externalists discuss their theories in 
terms of the determination of mental content, this does not preclude assessing 
their theories from the point of view of explanatory scientific strategy. As is the 
case with Chomskyan internalists, externalists attempt to explain the phenomena 
of language production and comprehension, and thus it is valid to assess the 
success of these explanations and compare them to competing theories that also 
try to explain the same phenomena. That is, substantive theoretical or 
philosophical differences are necessarily also ones of explanatory strategy. Since 
the aim of science is to construct theories that explain and predict phenomena, it 
is valid for one to compare these two approaches that claim to be scientific from 
the point of view of explanatory strategies. 
 
2.1. Internalism, Externalism, and Science 
 
Debates about the scientific status of linguistic theories are of course nothing 
new. Robert Lees’s review of Chomsky (1957) argues that it was one of the first 
serious attempts at linguistic science “which may be understood in the same 
sense that a chemical, biological theory is ordinarily understood by experts in 
those fields” (Lees 1957: 377). Lees is one of the first in a long tradition that has 
supported the scientific claims of generative linguistics. Recently, John Collins 
remarked that “the greatest service Chomsky has provided for philosophy is to 
do philosophy of science via the construction of a new science” (Collins 2008: 25; 
see also Collins 2006). James McGilvray argues in regard to the “cognitive aspect 
of the faculty of language, or the computational system itself” that “there is a 
serious scientific enterprise devoted to its investigation, and with respect to 
capturing its structure, at least, there has been considerable progress” (McGilvray 
1998: 238). Moreover, he says that he is “perfectly happy to say that the various 
branches of syntax are physical sciences, even if they are sciences of what is in the 
head, for all that ‘physical’ means is that one has an honest science” (p. 243). 
 Another example is Alec Marantz, who states that mainstream generative 
linguistics “operates at the nexus of computation, philosophy of language, and 
E. Asoulin 
 
234 
cognitive neuroscience” (Marantz 2005: 431). Cedric Boeckx and Massimo 
Piattelli-Palmarini write that “[t]he Chomskyan revolution in linguistics in the 
1950s in essence turned linguistics into a branch of cognitive science (and ulti-
mately biology) by both changing the linguistic landscape and forcing a radical 
change in cognitive science to accommodate linguistics […]”, and thus they “are 
persuaded, on solid grounds we think, that in the past 50 years [generative] 
linguistics has progressively established itself as a genuinely scientific discipline” 
(Boeckx & Piattelli-Palmarini 2005: 447). 
 How should one assess these claims? What definition or methodology of 
science can one appeal to in order to argue for or against the scientific status of a 
theory of language? Lees hints at a key distinguishing factor that can identify 
good science: an axiomatic system and an overarching explanatory theory. He 
compares Chomsky’s approach to studying language to the development of 
chemistry: It was only after Lavoisier’s work in the late eighteenth century that 
chemistry developed from its beginnings in alchemy to a scientific discipline. 
Lavoisier’s work allowed chemistry to achieve its scientific status by pushing the 
discipline to concern itself not so much with the correctness of its postulates — 
though that is of course essential — but with explanatory theory construction.   
 I take it that for a given approach to qualify as scientific it must possess an 
overarching explanatory theory and an accompanying axiomatic system. I will 
gloss over the details of what makes an approach scientific because, for the 
purposes of this article, both externalism and Chomskyan internalism can be said 
to have the form and methods of a scientific theory. I want to argue that 
externalism is not unscientific but rather bad science in the sense that it has 
chosen a subject matter that is not amendable to fruitful scientific theorising. This 
is so due to the creative aspect of language use. In other words, criteria for a 
given approach to qualify as scientific such as possessing an overarching 
explanatory theory, though necessary for qualifying as scientific, are not 
sufficient to distinguish a fecund and deeply explanatory science from one that is 
not. Chomskyan internalism proposes an explanatory theory, but, arguably, so 
does externalism: Putnam remarks that “a better philosophy and a better science of 
language” must encompass the “social dimension of cognition” and the 
“contribution of the environment, other people, and the world” to semantics 
(Putnam 1975: 193, my emphasis). Horwich (2001: 371) argues that Davidson’s 
externalist truth-theoretic program “became widely accepted, instigating several 
decades of ‘normal science’ in semantics.” Davidson himself is somewhat 
ambivalent, but still holds that “my own approach to the description, analysis (in 
a rough sense), and explanation of thought, language, and action has […] what I 
take to be some of the characteristics of a science” (Davidson 2004: 123). Burge 
(2003: 465) remarks that he sees no reason why formal semantics, which postu-
lates “reference, or a technical analogue, as a relation between linguistic represen-
tations and real aspects of the world, should not be an area of fruitful systematic 
scientific investigation”. 
 So apart from the construction of a self-consistent explanatory theory, 
which both externalism and internalism arguably have, what can distinguish the 
two in regard to their scientific fecundity? I propose that the distinguishing 
criterion should be the subject matter of their theories. It is not enough to have an 
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explanatorily self-consistent theory: Your theory must be aimed at a scientifically 
tractable aspect of the world. In other words, if your theory fails to divide nature 
at the joints, then no improvement of its methodology or its explanations will 
matter. To repeat, I want to suggest that externalists, when claiming to be doing 
science, are simply doing bad science — their research is aimed at a scientifically 
intractable aspect of the world. Observations of the creative aspect of language 
use imply that if one takes language use — or performance as opposed to 
competence — as the subject matter of one’s theory, as externalists do, then such 
a theory is unlikely to yield a deeply explanatory science. Before I offer an 
argument for this, a few remarks of clarification are in order.  
 
2.2. Internalism versus Individualism 
 
Putnam constructs various thought experiments to argue for the externalist claim 
that the individuation of meanings is impossible if one only considers thinkers in 
isolation, and thus a semantic theory must consider the person’s interaction with 
the environment and with other language users. The Twin Earth thought experi-
ment is the most famous, but there are others that make the same point. One of 
which concerns the difference between an elm tree and a beech tree. Putnam 
claims to have the same concept for both elm trees and beech trees because, 
unlike botanists, he cannot tell them apart. But Putnam claims that ‘elm’ and 
‘beech’ nevertheless have different meanings when he utters them. This is so 
even though, ex hypothesi, his mind-internal phenomena are identical whenever 
he utters ‘elm’ or ‘beech’. Therefore, according to Putnam, considering the mind-
external environment — the expert botanists, in this case — is the only way to 
discern the meaning of his utterance of ‘elm’ or ‘beech’. He argues that one’s 
“individual psychological state certainly does not fix its extension; it is only the 
sociolinguistic state of the collective linguistic body to which the speaker belongs 
that fixes the extension” (Putnam 1975: 146, emphasis in original).  
 It is hard to argue with such a claim; of course one can only discern what a 
person’s utterance refers to by consulting the external environment. In order to 
determine the extension of Putnam’s utterance of either ‘elm’ or ‘beech’ one must 
consult not only Putnam’s mind-internal states and knowledge but also the 
knowledge of an expert who can distinguish between an elm and a beech, as well 
as the environment in which the utterance was produced. Be that as it may, 
however, the question arises as to the connection between such a search for 
individuation conditions and a science of language. That is, what is the 
connection, if any, between the search for the conditions under which one is 
justified in ascribing a particular meaning to an utterance, and a science of 
language that seeks to explain how linguistic utterances are produced and 
comprehended? I argue that studying the mechanisms in the mind by which 
meaning is made possible is one enterprise, the ascription of meaning to 
particular utterances another.3 
                                                 
    3  Cf. Devitt (1984: 385): “[T]houghts are one thing, their ascription another [… it is a mistake 
for philosophers to] start with the theory of thought ascription, leaving the theory of 
thought pretty much to look after itself”. 
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 Millikan (2004b: 227) concurs when she says in regard to Putnam’s argu-
ment that if “we explain the externalist idea in this crude way […] it becomes 
hard to see how anyone could deny it”. That is, “[i]f the question were, merely, 
how are the referents or extensions of thoughts determined, it seems patently 
obvious that nothing inside someone’s head could, by itself, determine that any-
thing in particular existed outside the head”. Millikan says that externalism so 
defined should not be so obviously true, but instead of turning against external-
ism she clings to it. But her remedy does not help and in fact complicates the 
matter further. Her externalist theory defines “inner representations by the way 
they function, not just in the head, but as parts of much larger systems that in-
clude portions of the environment” (p. 229). The functions of the inner represen-
tations, on Millikan’s account, were selected by natural selection in the course of 
the organism interacting with its environment in a ‘normal’ way. Thus, it is “this 
reference to a certain kind of history of selection and/or development that adds 
the radically externalist twist to this theory of mental representation” (ibid.). 
 Millikan believes that mental representations can only be individuated by 
reference to their function, and thus she argues that we must adopt an externalist 
and evolutionary stance to individuation because “[w]hat a thing was designed 
to do is not always evident just from its inner function, even from its inner 
function plus the structure of its current environment” (ibid.; see also Millikan 
1984, 1993, 2004a). She remarks that “whether an inner happening or structure is 
a representation is not merely a matter of its inner structure”. But the question 
again arises as to whether this claim is relevant to scientific theories of meaning 
or mental representations that attempt to discover the mechanisms by which 
language production and comprehension are possible? Externalists claim that the 
criteria of the ascription of meaning or of function belong in a scientific theory of 
language, but I argue that this will not yield a fruitful science.  
 As a final remark, it should be noted that Chomskyan internalism is 
compatible with the view that the individuation of meanings is impossible without 
considering the environmental context of an utterance. If the aim of your theory 
is to discover the conditions under which an outside observer can make a correct 
judgement as to the meaning of a specific utterance (relative to the way the 
meaning is used within the linguistic community of the speaker), then of course 
such a theory must include within its domain the environment outside the head. 
But such a claim has little to do with a scientific theory of meaning. The externalist 
claim that it does follows from their glossing over an important distinction 
between the theory itself and the way in which the theorist uses and interprets the 
theory to achieve certain explanatory goals (cf. Egan 1995, 1999, 2003). This ambi-
guity is evident in remarks such as Ben-Menahem’s (2005), who notes in regard 
to one of Putnam’s examples that “to speak of coffee tables it does not suffice for 
us merely to have the concept of a coffee table, but we must be in contact with 
actual coffee tables” (p. 10, emphasis in original). In other words, there’s an 
ambiguity between a theory that explains our ability to have the concept of, say, a 
coffee table, and a theory that purports to explain how it is that we use this 
concept to talk about actual coffee tables. Or, more generally, the difference is 
between a theory of the mechanisms in virtue of which language production and 
comprehension is made possible, and a theory of the use of those mechanisms in, 
The Creative Aspect of Language Use 
 
237 
say, social interaction. When externalists claim that a science of language must 
encompass the social dimension of linguistic behaviour, it is not clear whether 
the claim is that this aspect of linguistic behaviour must be included within the 
scope of the theory itself, or whether this aspect can be connected to the theory by 
what Egan calls the theory’s interpretation function. This distinction is important, 
for failure to adhere to it results in a defective explanatory theory. 
 
 
3. Can Externalism Form the Basis of a Fruitful Science of Language? 
 
Let us now look at an externalist theory of language in detail in order to assess 
whether it can form the basis of a fecund and explanatory scientific theory of 
language.  
 
3.1. Horwich’s Use-Theory of Meaning 
 
Horwich (2005, 2008, 2010) claims that his use-based semantics is compatible 
with a linguistics construed as an empirical science. I give a brief sketch of his 
theory — by contrasting it with truth-theoretic semantics — and then argue that 
the reasons for doubting Horwich’s scientific claims are the same as the reasons 
for rejecting externalist theories of meaning in general as candidates for fruitful 
scientific theories of language.  
 Horwich (2008) is a critique of mainstream formal semantics in which he 
argues that there is no reason to think that language has a truth theoretic basis. 
He correctly points out that while the problems truth-theoretic semantics 
presents “are highly challenging, requiring considerable skill and ingenuity, and 
that enormous progress has been made in these endeavours over the last forty 
years or so”, citing such progress “is not enough to vindicate truth-theoretic 
semantics as an empirical subject, as an integral part of the global scientific 
enterprise” (p. 318, fn. 12, emphasis in original). He argues that in order to be 
scientific, truth-theoretic semanticists must show how their derivations have 
contributed to the explanation of observable events. However, “that has not, and 
cannot, be done” (ibid.).4 
 Horwich’s main objection to truth-theoretic semantics has to do with 
compositionality and the assumption of formal semanticists that the focus of 
semantics should be sentence meanings. Davidson’s truth-theoretic approach, for 
example, involves a compositional theory of meaning in which the meanings of 
sentences depend on the meanings of their constituent words. Horwich takes the 
opposite approach, for he believes that compositionality is relatively easy to 
accommodate and thus one needs to first identify the meanings of words and 
then “presupposing compositionality, to trivially deduce the theoretical-
meanings of sentences” (ibid., 314).  
                                                 
    4  I think this is too strong a claim. Externalist truth-theoretic approaches to semantics that 
have as their subject matter language use are unlikely to yield a fruitful scientific theory of 
linguistic meanings. However, the internalist construal of truth-theoretic semantics has 
promising and illuminating results (cf. Hinzen 2006). I share Horwich’s scepticism in regard 
to truth-theoretic semantics but I think that an internalist take on it has some value (cf. also 
Pietroski 2005, 2010). 
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 Inverting the focus of semantics from sentences to words has the deflati-
onary effect of nullifying truth-theoretic semantics because truth conditions 
apply to sentences and not to words. Given this focus on words, Horwich 
suggests that the theoretical characterisation of word meanings should be 
deduced not from sentence meaning but from sentence usage. And so his alter-
native is an externalist semantic theory that rejects truth conditions in favour of 
the claim that “the underlying basis of each word’s meaning is the (idealized) law 
governing its usage—a law that dictates the ‘acceptance conditions’ of certain 
specified sentences containing it” (Horwich 2005: 26). This law of acceptance con-
ditions purportedly solves the puzzle of why it is that, say, ‘The sky is blue’ tends 
to be recognised as true.  
 Horwich believes that the phenomena that semantics needs to explain are 
those of sentence acceptance. He elaborates: “I don’t mean ‘accepted as gramma-
tical’, but ‘accepted as true’, i.e. ‘in the belief-box’.” Moreover, acceptance “some-
times leads to utterance (depending on the speaker’s desires); therefore explaining 
the acceptance of a sentence may contribute to explaining its being uttered” 
(Horwich 2008: 315, fn. 9, emphasis in original). According to Horwich, there are 
scientific laws that govern sentence acceptance. Given such laws, “it will be rela-
tively easy to see how word-meanings, alongside other factors, will be capable of 
explaining what needs to be explained (namely, the acceptance-status of all sen-
tences containing it)” (p. 318, emphasis in original). And so insofar as linguistics 
is an empirical science, says Horwich, “standing alongside psychology, neuro-
logy, biology, physics, etc.”, such acceptance-laws “should be testable against 
concrete observable events” (p. 315). Thus, “the semanticist of a given language 
ought to be looking, concerning each word, for the basic law governing its use” 
(p. 319), and if such laws are forthcoming and explanatorily fruitful, Horwich 
believes that “[s]emantics would then somewhat resemble fundamental physics” 
(p. 318). In other words, the claim is that there are law-like regularities of word 
use, which are purportedly “characterised in non-semantic, non-normative 
terms” — that is, in naturalistic, scientific terms. These regularities are then used 
to derive facts about which rules of language use people implicitly follow. These 
regularities and rules, then, “suffice to fix what we mean by our words and hence 
sentences” (Horwich 2010: 113, emphasis in original). 
 
3.2. Problems with Use-Theories of Meaning 
 
Horwich writes that if “a semantic theory explains the phenomena of sentence-
acceptance — and if it coheres with theories of phonology, syntax, and prag-
matics to yield a science that explains all the phenomena of linguistic activity — 
then it is a good theory” (Horwich 2008: 319). He argues that truth-theoretic 
semantics cannot yield such a science but that his use-based semantics can. 
However, since both are externalist theories that claim to find scientifically 
tractable regularities in language production, and due to the creative aspect of 
language use, I argue that they cannot yield a fruitful and explanatory science of 
language.  
 As noted above, Horwich believes that “the underlying basis of each 
word’s meaning is the (idealized) law governing its usage” (Horwich 2005: 26). 
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He claims that in order to make linguistics an empirical science semanticists need 
to look for the basic laws governing the use of words, but this assumes that there 
are scientifically interesting regularities in language use; and that is far from 
obvious. Moreover, the phenomenon of, say, a particular word’s usage, is merely 
the effect of the internal psychological mechanisms of language. The regularities 
of language use, such as they are, do not explain anything but rather are what 
needs to be explained. Cummins (2000) talks of the ‘scandal’ of the widely held 
belief that scientific explanation is subsumption under law: “Laws tell us what 
the mind does, not how it does it. We want to know how the mind works, not 
just what it does” (p. 140). It is the capacity for language use that science seeks to 
explain, and laws of word use that Horwich postulates are at best the effects of 
this capacity. The laws describe the data to be explained, but the explanation 
itself involves the mechanisms in virtue of which language use is made possible. 
In fact, most scientific explanation in general follows what Thagard (2012) calls 
the mechanista view of scientific method, which holds that to explain a pheno-
menon is to describe a mechanism that produces it. Thus, in order to be an 
explanatory theory, use-based semantics needs not only laws of word use, the 
existence of which is tenuous at best, but also the mechanisms in virtue of which 
word use is made possible. 
 More specifically, sentence acceptance, a main tenet of Horwich’s theory, is 
deeply problematic, and it is unclear whether it can be generalised beyond the 
examples that Horwich gives (cf. Schiffer 2000). But even if the notion of sentence 
acceptance can be spelled out, use theories of meaning, as Gupta (2003) remarks, 
rest “on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are 
fundamental to an explanation of the acceptance of sentences with principles that 
are fundamental to meaning” (p. 654; cf. also Gupta 1993). That is, sentence 
acceptance may overlap to some extent with sentence meaning, but they are not 
the same thing. Gupta argues that there is little reason to think that explanatorily 
basic patterns of sentence acceptance in Horwich’s theory can provide the 
meaning of a word. This is because “the acceptance of sentences depends not just 
on the meanings of words but also on the methods of obtaining information (and 
misinformation) about the world” (Gupta 2003: 666).  
 
3.3. Problems with Externalist Theories in General 
 
Whatever the details of use theories of meaning and their idiosyncratic 
difficulties, they are still externalist theories and thus face the same general 
problems as all externalist theories. 
 The fact that sentence acceptance depends not just on the meanings of 
words but also on the methods of obtaining information about the world hints at 
the main reason for the inability of externalist theories such as Horwich’s to serve 
as fruitful scientific theories of language: The problem is the subject matter and 
scope of the theories. The reason is the same reason given by Katz & Fodor (1963: 
179) fifty years ago. They ask the reader to compare the following three senten-
ces: Should we take junior back to the zoo? Should we take the lion back to the zoo? 
Should we take the bus back to the zoo? They then remark that, for example, “[i]nfor-
mation which figures in the choice of the correct readings for these sentences 
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includes the fact that lions, but not children and busses, are often kept in cages”. 
After listing a handful of other examples, they note that the “reader will find it an 
easy matter to construct an ambiguous sentence whose resolution requires the 
representation of practically any item of information about the world he 
chooses”. Thus, a linguistic theory that takes it upon itself to resolve such 
ambiguities clearly must include within its scope every feature of the world that 
speakers may need in order to arrive at the correct reading of an ambiguous 
utterance. But practically any piece of information about the world is potentially 
relevant. Further problems arise when theorists investigate the truth of an 
utterance in relation to the mind-external world.  
 A theory that includes language use and the mind’s relations to the world 
within its explanatory scope cannot hope to find reliable relations of this sort — 
let alone systematise them into a fruitful explanatory scientific theory. This is due 
to the creative aspect of language use: If language use is indeed uncaused in the 
above sense, but is at the same time coherent and appropriate to the 
circumstances at hand, then there will be no scientifically interesting regularities 
of the sort Horwich and other externalists claim to exist. This is in addition to the 
fact that even if there were such regularities, they would merely be a rewording 
of the phenomena to be explained. 
 One can of course still ask why we should not hope for a serious science of 
phenomena that are uncaused yet appropriate to circumstances. The relevant 
science does not exist at present, it can be objected, but this does not prove that 
such a science is impossible.5 The reason we should not hope for a serious science 
of these phenomena is not so much, as Chomsky at times avers (e.g., Chomsky 
1988a: 35–36, 2000a: 145), that it may be beyond our cognitive reach. Rather, the 
reason is that explanatory science deals with mechanisms, not with laws of use 
(in this case explanatory science deals with the mechanisms in virtue of which 
language use is made possible, not with language use itself). Laws tell us what 
the mind does, not how it does it, and it is the latter that an explanatory science 
seeks to illuminate. I do not want to imply that an externalist science of linguistic 
meaning is impossible in principle. Externalism is not unscientific but rather bad 
science in the sense that it has chosen a subject matter for itself that is not 
amendable to fruitful scientific theorising. 
 Another problem is that meaning is defined in externalist theories in a way 
that makes them unable to distinguish between the speaker’s linguistic 
knowledge and their world knowledge. In Putnam’s example of elms and 
beeches, the theorist must consult not only the mind-internal mechanisms of the 
speaker but also their, and other speakers’, world knowledge. To really know 
whether Putnam’s utterance means ‘elm’ or ‘beech’ the theorist must, according 
to externalism, (1) consult Putnam’s linguistic knowledge, (2) his world know-
ledge about elms and beeches (and whether he can tell them apart), and (3) the 
world knowledge of other speakers (the expert botanists who can tell the differ-
ence between elms and beeches). Clearly, then, externalists demand that a theory 
of linguistic meaning include within its scope not only the internal linguistic 
                                                 
    5  I thank an anonymous reviewer of an earlier draft of this article for bringing this potential 
objection to my attention. 
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mechanisms of the speaker, but also the world knowledge of the speaker and the 
relation that holds between the speaker’s utterance and the world. But if all of the 
aforementioned must be included in the same theory, then externalism cannot in 
principle distinguish between linguistic knowledge and world knowledge (cf. 
Haiman 1980).  
 In other words, a linguistic ability is couched by externalists in terms of 
representations of all the knowledge about the world that speakers share. How-
ever, as Katz & Fodor remark, “since there is no serious possibility of systematiz-
ing all the knowledge of the world that speakers share, and since a theory of the 
kind we have been discussing requires such a systematization, it is ipso facto not 
a serious model for semantics” (Katz & Fodor 1963: 179).6 The same holds for all 
externalist theories of meaning: They are not a serious model for scientific theories 
of meaning because their subject matter is too wide in scope. That is, if the crea-
tive aspect of language use is the subject matter of your theories, and if Descartes 
was right to point out the uncaused yet appropriate nature of language use, then 
externalist theories of language use will not yield a fruitful and explanatory 
science. As outlined in the next section, however, a scientific theory of the 
mechanisms that underlie language use is possible. 
 
 
4. The Internalist Explanation of the Creative Aspect of Language Use 
 
I argue that the Chomskyan internalist approach to linguistic science avoids the 
pitfalls of externalist theories of language and thus provides a promising 
candidate for an explanatory and fecund linguistic science. Externalism construes 
linguistic meanings in a way that makes construction of a fruitful science of them 
unlikely. Internalist linguistic meanings, on the other hand, are in a form that is 
amendable to fruitful explanatory science.  
 The subject matter of generative linguistics is taken to be linguistic 
competence, the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of their language, as opposed to 
linguistic performance, which is the actual use of this knowledge in language 
production and comprehension. This distinction forms the foundation of 
generative linguistics and Chomskyan internalism. The actual use of the 
knowledge of one’s language involves many other factors and phenomena, only 
one of which is one’s competence. It is only under strict idealisation conditions 
that performance might be seen as reflecting competence, and the actual causal 
sequence that brings about a speech act is not directly related to competence.  
 Another distinction is that between I-language and E-language (Chomsky 
1986). Externalised (E-)language refers to actual speech events, with some 
account of their context of use. From the E-language point of view, then, a 
grammar is a collection of statements that describe linguistic performance. 
Moreover, on this account there need not be one ‘real’ or ‘correct’ grammar that 
corresponds to the corpus data: As long as it yields a correct description of the 
                                                 
    6  It is worth noting that, as I have argued elsewhere, Fodor appears to have changed his mind 
about what a serious model of semantics entails. Since at least the 1980s he has argued in 
favour of an externalist semantics. Cf. Asoulin (2012). 
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corpus data, any number of grammars could in principle apply.7 David Lewis, for 
example, says that he can find no way to “make objective sense of the assertion 
that a grammar G is used by population P whereas another grammar G' which 
generates the same language as G, is not” (Lewis 1975: 177). He believes that a 
language is an abstract, formal system that a population selects by convention (cf. 
Lewis 1969). Similarly, Dretske (1997) claims that “everything we in fact call a 
language, at least a natural language, is the product of social factors” (p. 289). 
Another manifestation of E-language can be seen in Devitt & Sterelny (1989), who 
argue that rather than being about competence, linguistics is about the properties 
and relations of observable, external, linguistic symbols (cf. Devitt 2006). 
 According to the E-language conception, then, language is, as it were, ‘out 
there’, it is not intimately related to the mind. A case in point is Deacon (1997), 
who is critical of the Chomskyan approach to studying language acquisition, and 
says: 
 
They [Chomskyans] assert that the source for prior support for language 
acquisition must originate from inside the brain, on the unstated assumption 
that there is no other possible source. But there is another alternative: that 
the extra support for language learning is vested neither in the brain of the 
child nor in the brains of parents or teachers, but outside brains, in language 
itself.                             (Deacon 1997: 105, emphasis in original, my emphasis8) 
 
On the internalised (I-)language perspective, however, language is conceived as 
being intimately related with the mind in that there is some structure in the mind 
of the speaker/hearer that is responsible for their language. So, unlike the E-
language conception of grammar, the grammar qua I-language is a theory of a 
real mental structure to which “questions of truth and falsity arise […] as they do 
for any scientific theory” (Chomsky 1986: 22). An I-language is a generative pro-
cedure in the mind of a speaker/hearer that creates a structural description that 
combines phonetic, semantic, and structural properties. 
 The Chomskyan internalist claim is that the proper subject matter of a 
scientific linguistics should be the knowledge a speaker/hearer has of their lang-
uage, the knowledge (a structure in the mind/brain) that underlies and makes 
possible, along with other factors, the speaker/hearer’s language production and 
comprehension. 
 
4.1. Semantics and Chomskyan Internalism 
 
In the Chomskyan internalist approach to semantics, the language faculty derives 
an expression Exp by assembling features from the array of lexical items and 
mapping them to the Phon and Sem representations (i.e. Exp = <Phon, Sem>). The 
semantic features of an expression (Sem) are mental instructions that interface 
with, and thus give information to, the conceptual-intentional systems. Sem is the 
                                                 
    7 Cf. Quine (1972) and Lewis (1975), both of whom Chomsky (1986) cites as indicative of the 
E-language approach. For other E-language approaches, see, for example, Wallace (1977), 
Devitt & Sterelny (1987, 1989), and Devitt (2006). See also Millikan (2003) and Chomsky 
(2003). 
    8 Cf. Chomsky (2000: 22) for discussion of Deacon's view. 
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interface between the language faculty and the systems of thought. This 
approach mirrors the approach to phonology in which phonetic features of an 
expression (Phon) are mental instructions that interface with, and thus give 
information to, the sensorimotor systems. The arrays of semantic features that are 
part of Sem are, as many have repeatedly noted, much more complex and 
difficult to investigate than the phonological representations. Nevertheless, 
valuable and fruitful progress has been made in regard to semantic features. 
 Pietroski (2006) compares linguistic meanings in Chomskyan internalism to 
blueprints, which are produced by the language faculty for constructing concepts 
from lexicalised elements. At a higher level is the I-language, which is a 
biologically-instantiated procedure that pairs phonological instructions with 
semantic instructions; other systems then execute these instructions. Sems are thus 
not to be thought of as concepts, for construing them as concepts “may be a 
category mistake, like evaluating an instruction to fetch a rabbit as male or female” 
(Pietroski 2010: 252, emphasis in original). In other words, what we have are 
instructions to build concepts, which provide the inputs to other systems that enter 
into various human actions, one of which is communication. Chomskyan 
internalist semantics, then, concerns the nature of the instructions given by the 
language faculty to the systems of thought; it concerns not the concepts 
themselves but the instructions to fetch, build, and combine concepts. In other words, 
it concerns the mechanisms of concept creation (cf. Pietroski 2008).  
 This is of course one step removed from what externalist semantics studies, 
which is the concepts themselves, their role in language use, their relation to the 
speaker’s environment, and their truth values. As Pietroski remarks, the work of 
a Chomskyan internalist “will take the form of saying how meaningful I-
expressions can be used to build concepts that are inputs to a more complex 
process of building concepts that we can use to make truth-evaluable judge-
ments” (Pietroski 2010: 272, emphasis in original). 
 Externalist theories that include within their scope the relation of, say, con-
cepts to the world, run into overwhelming problems, some of which I discussed 
above. Whereas Chomskyan internalist theories study the mechanisms in virtue 
of which concept construction and language use is made possible: These are 
expressions produced by an internal linguistic engine whose components have 
no direct relation to the outside world. The Sem features are used to construct 
concepts that are then used by other systems to make truth-evaluable assertions, 
or communicate an idea, or any number of uses to which language can be put. 
 The current abstract form of the Sem features will of course be refined until 
the theoretical vocabulary of a serious science of meaning emerges. But they are a 
good starting point, for they help recast the notion of linguistic meaning into a 
form that is susceptible to fruitful scientific investigation. The instructions at the 
Sem interface that are interpreted by the performance systems are used in the act 
of talking and thinking about the world. And so, on this view of meaning, the 
instructions to create concepts play the role of “focus[ing] attention on selected 
aspects of the world as it is taken to be by other cognitive systems, and provide 
intricate and highly specialized perspectives from which to view them, crucially 
involving human interests and concerns even in the simplest cases” (Chomsky 
2000: 125). 
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 In summary, then, Chomskyan internalism postulates a mind/brain-
internal generative procedure —  an I-language — that generates expressions of 
the form Exp = <Phon, Sem>. This expression (via the Phon and Sem interfaces) is 
then used by systems outside of the language faculty (but internal to the 
mind/brain) in language production and comprehension. Chomskyan 
internalism argues that what is relevant to and tractable by a scientific theory of 
language are the mechanisms operating within the mind/brain, thus avoiding 
the problematic aspects of externalist theories discussed above. This of course 
does not mean that the mind is completely detached from the outside 
environment (it’s not), nor does it mean that one must individuate meanings by 
making use of only individualistic or organism-internal vocabulary — for there is 
the distinction between the computational theory itself and its interpretation by 
the theorist. Rather, the upshot of Chomskyan internalism is that whatever 
connection the mind has with the out-side world, that connection is unlikely to be 
within the scope of a fruitful scientific theory of language. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The argument against externalist theories of language qua fruitful scientific 
theories that appeals to the creative aspect of language use is as follows: Since 
language use allows for an unbounded expression of thought and is independent 
of direct stimulus control but at the same time it is appropriate to new situations 
and is coherent in new contexts, a fruitful externalist scientific theory of language 
use is unlikely. People can produce and comprehend an infinite number of novel 
utterances, and it is problematic at best to try to account for their linguistic 
behaviour directly: No scientifically interesting lawful correlations or predictions 
of potential linguistic behaviour will be found.  
 This of course does not mean that the mechanisms that make language use 
possible cannot be studied, but it does mean that the creative aspect of language 
use will perhaps remain, as Chomsky puts it, not merely a problem but a mystery 
(cf., among many others, Chomsky 1982: 429). Though one possibility of dispel-
ling the mystery, still as remote today to pursue seriously as it was when 
Descartes suggested it, is to postulate a ‘thinking substance’, a new aspect of 
mind. As Bracken (1970a) explains, the Cartesians saw no way of extending their 
physical explanations to cover mental phenomena, and so it was suggested that a 
new principle, the ‘creative’ principle, must be added to the vocabulary of 
science. This is on the analogy of the postulation of the then new principle of 
gravity: The occult qualities of gravity were methodologically objectionable to 
both the Cartesians and to Newton but they accepted it “largely because the 
powerful mathematical model Newton employed carried against all a priori 
objections” (ibid., 237).  
 The explanatory success of theories of mind is of course far smaller than 
that of Newtown’s theory of gravity, but it is worth remembering that even 
Newton regarded the postulation of gravity as “inconceivable” and “so great an 
absurdity that […] no man who has in philosophical matters any competent 
faculty of thinking can ever fall into it” (quoted in Chomsky 1993: 38). But 
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scientists were eventually forced to accept it due to its mathematical and 
explanatory power, for gravity gave an account of the essence of matter. The 
Cartesians, especially as their ideas developed with the Port-Royal tradition, 
attempted to do the same to the mind. That is, “in grammar we can derive an 
account of the essence of mind parallel to the account which geometry gives us of 
the essence of matter” (Bracken 1983: 22). The Cartesians had no model by which 
to explain the essence of mind that was equivalent to Newton’s postulation of 
gravity as the essence of matter, and that is what the Port-Royal tradition 
attempted to provide. Today, Chomsky sees generative linguistics as reviving the 
Port-Royal efforts to provide a mathematical model of the mind that would take 
some steps towards an account of the essence of mind, but now with a more 
restricted subject matter and armed with modern mathematical tools such as 
those provided by Alan Turing and others (cf. Bracken 1970a, 1970b, 1983). 
 To recap, then, externalist theories of language are concerned with 
normative and epistemic notions such as truth and reference, and these notions 
are clearly aspects of language use. But if Descartes and Chomsky are right to 
argue that the creative aspect of language use is now — and perhaps to remain — 
beyond the scope of scientific explanations then an externalist theory of language 
that is an explanatorily fruitful scientific theory is unlikely. As McGilvray (2005: 
204) puts it: “Because people use words for all sorts of purposes, because the use 
of language is a form of free action, and because there is little reason to think that 
there can be a science of free action, there is little reason to think that there can be 
a naturalistic externalist theory of meaning”. 
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